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We introduce two ways of comparing information structures, say I and
J. First we say that I is richer than J when for every compact game G, all
correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by J are also induced by I.
Second, we say that J is faithfully reproducable from I when all the players
can compute from their information in I “new information” that they could
have received from J. We prove that I is richer than J if and only if J is
faithfully reproducable from I.
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1 Introduction
Information structures were deﬁned by Aumann ([Au74]) to introduce the
concepts of correlated equilibrium and of correlated equilibrium distributions.
Given a game G and an information structure I, the game G extended by I is
the game in which players ﬁrst receive information according to I, and second
play in G. The distributions on the actions of G induced by Nash equilibria of
this game are called the correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced by I.




players may wish to toss a coin, then play (T,L) if heads shows, and (B,R)
otherwise. These strategies are a Nash equilibrium of the game extended by the
coin information structure, and the induced distribution on the actions of the
game is 1
2(T,L)+1
2(B,R). One could wonder: “What if the players do not have
a coin at disposition?”. In fact, there are many other information structures
that can replace the coin, like a (fair, 6-sided) die. Consider players that observe
the outcome of a die, and play (T,L) if the observed outcome is even, and (B,R)
otherwise. This deﬁnes a Nash equilibrium of the game extended by the dice
information structure inducing the same distribution as before. The fact that
a coin can be replaced by a die does not depend on the particular (battle of
sexes) game. In fact, for any game G, all correlated equilibrium distributions of
G induced by the coin are also correlated equilibrium distributions of G induced
by the die. We deﬁne an information structure I to be richer than another J
whenever for any game G, all correlated equilibrium distributions of G extended
by J are also correlated equilibrium distributions of G extended by I.
It is striking that in correlated equilibria, players condition their actions on
their information about the state of nature, even though it is common knowledge
that the payoﬀs of the game do not depend on the state of nature. This is
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actually not a contradiction since, for a given player, diﬀerent signals imply
diﬀerent beliefs on the actions of the other players, which justiﬁes diﬀerent
choices of actions1. After getting his signal, and before playing the game, a
player may forget part of his information if it reveals nothing about the actions
the others are about to take. For instance, a player observing the outcome of
the die and who believes that the others will act only according to the parity
of the outcome may keep only the information “even”, or “odd”. Renaming
“even” and “odd” as “heads” and “tails”, we see that if they forget part of
their information about the outcome of the die, players get “new” signals as if
issued by a coin.
More generally, if players get signals issued by I, they can compute “new”
(or interpreted) signals that could have been sent by J. An interpretation φ
from I to J describes how players compute these new signals. We call an inter-
pretation φ a compatible interpretation when the probability of the interpreted
signals induced by the distribution of signals in I and by φ is equal to the
probability of the signals issued by J. Moreover, a compatible interpretation is
said to be a faithful interpretation when every player has the same conditional
probability over the interpreted signal of the other players, conditional on his
original signal (given by I) or on his interpreted one. In other words, φ is
faithful if no player loses information by computing his interpreted signal and
forgetting his original one.
Our main result is that I is richer than J if and only if there exists a faithful
interpretation from I to J.
Section 2 contains preliminaries, in Section 3 we present the diﬀerent ways
of comparing information structures. Section 4 contains the proof of the main
result. In general, we can not assume the interpretation to be deterministic.
Players may randomize to compute their new signals. In section 5 some exam-
ples are presented, as well as conditions under which the interpretations can be
assumed to be deterministic.
1See Aumann’s [Au87] article for the close relation between correlated equilibria and
Bayesian rationality
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2 Preliminaries
2.1 General notations
Throughout the paper, I is the ﬁnite set of players. For every collection of sets
indexed by I (Zi)i∈I, Z represents

i Zi, and Z−i is

j =i Zj. Also, for z ∈ Z,
zi is the i-th coordinate of z, and z−i is (zj)j =i ∈ Z−j. For a topological set
W,∆ ( W) is the set of regular probability measures over the Borel σ-algebra
on W.I fP is a probability measure, EP represents the expectation operator
over P.
2.2 Extended games
A compact game G =( ( Si)i,g) is given by a compact set of strategies Si
for each player i and by a continuous payoﬀ function g from S to I RI. The
set of mixed strategies for player i is Σi =∆ ( Si), and g is extended to Σ by
g(σ)=Eσg(s) (the product set Πi∆(Si) is identiﬁed to be a subset of ∆(S)).
A Nash equilibrium of G is a proﬁle of mixed strategies σ ∈ Σ such that fo
every player i and τi ∈ Σi, gi(σ−i,τi) ≤ gi(σ).
In [Me94] for instance, a correlation device is given by a probability space
of states of nature by and a signaling function for each player that characterizes
his information about the state. Equivalently, if the signaling functions have
ﬁnite range, we represent information structures as probabilities over product
sets of signals. An information structure I =( ( Xi)i,µ) is given by a family
of ﬁnite sets Xi and by a probability measure µ over X. When x is drawn
according to µ, i is informed about xi. Without loss of generality, we assume
that all the signals of player i occur with a positive probability (for all xi ∈ Xi,
µ(xi) > 0).
Deﬁnition 2.1 For every compact game G and information structure I,
Γ(I,G) represents the game G extended by I deﬁned as follows:
- x ∈ X is drawn according to µ, each player i is informed about xi
- each player i chooses σi ∈ Σi
- the payoﬀs are given by g(σ)
A strategy for player i is a mapping fi from Xi to Σi, and the payoﬀ function
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of Γ(I,G) is given by gI(f)=Eµg(f(x))
Since X is ﬁnite, Γ(I,G) is also a compact game when ΣiXi
is endowed
with the product topology. D(I,G) represents the set of correlated equilibrium
distributions of G induced by I. Namely, it is the set of image distributions on
S of µ by Nash equilibria of Γ(I,G).
For xi ∈ Xi, let p(xi) ∈ ∆(X−i) denote the conditional probability of µ
given xi over X−i (p(xi)(x−i)=
µ(x−i,xi)
µ(xi) ).
Remark 2.1 We shall use the following characterization of Nash equilibria of
Γ(I,G):
f is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(I,G) if and only if for every player i and
xi ∈ Xi:
fi(xi) ∈ arg max
τi∈Σi Ep(xi)gi(τi,f−i(x−i))






This expresses the fact that a rational and bayesian player maximizes his ex-
pected payoﬀ conditional to his information.
3 Comparison of information structures
In this section, we introduce two ways of comparing information structures
I =( ( Xi)i,µ) and J =( ( Y i)i,ν).
The ﬁrst deﬁnition says that I is richer than J whenever I induces all the
correlated equilibrium distributions that are induced by J.
Deﬁnition 3.1 I is richer than J whenever for every compact game G,
D(I,G) ⊃ D(J,G).
For the second deﬁnition, we imagine that players receive signals from I,
and deﬁne conditions under which they can reproduce signals that could have
been issued by J.A ninterpretation mapping for player i from I to J is
an application φi from Xi to ∆(Y i). When xi is i’s signal in I, the interpreted
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signal in J is yi with probability φi(xi)(yi). An interpretation from I to J
is a family φ =( φi)i∈I of interpretation mappings for all the players. φ and
φ−i =( φj)j =i deﬁne mappings from X to ∆(Y ) and from X−i to ∆(Y −i) when
Πi∆(Y i) and Πj =i∆(Y i) are identiﬁed to subsets of ∆(Y ) and ∆(Y −i).
Deﬁnition 3.2 A consistent interpretation from I to J is an interpreta-
tion φ =( φi)i such that the image of µ by φ is ν, namely such that for every
y ∈ Y , Eµφ(x)(y)=ν(y). J is reproducible from I when there exists a
consistent interpretation from I to J.
For the remainder of the section φ represents a compatible interpretation
from I to J. Let P be the probability induced on X×Y by µ and the transition
law φ. Explicitly P(x,y)=µ(x)φ(x)(y). The marginals of P on X and Y are
µ and ν, respectively.
We shall say that φ is faithful whenever no player loses information about
the interpreted signal of the others by relying on his interpreted signal and
forgetting his original one. We shall express it in diﬀerent ways that will turn
out to be equivalent.
We can compare the conditional probabilities q(yi)(y−i)=P(y−i/yi) and
r(xi)(y−i)=P(y−i/xi) for φ(xi)(yi) > 0. These can been seen as “ex ante”
and “ex post” conditional probabilities over the interpreted signals of players
others than i when i’s signal is xi and his interpreted signal is yi. We shall
view q(yi) and r(xi) as random variables with values in ∆(Y −i). Note that
r(xi)=Ep(xi)φ−i(x−i).
Deﬁnition 3.3 An interpretation φ from I to J is faithful whenever it is
compatible and for every i and xi ∈ Xi, Eφi(xi)q(yi)=r(xi). When there exists
a faithful interpretation from I to J, we say that J is faithfully reproducible
from I.
Another way of comparing information is to use the notion of comparison
of experiments due to Blackwell (see [Bl51] [Bl53]). Recall that an experi-
ment is a collection α =( u1,...,u n) of probability measures over some (ﬁnite)
space ˜ X. A point ˜ x ∈ ˜ X is selected according to one of the distributions
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(u1,...,u n), and is observed by the statistician. Given two experiments α and
β =( v1,...,v n) with vk ∈ ∆(˜ Y ) for k ∈{ 1,...,n}, we say that α is suﬃcient
for β whenever there exists a stochastic transformation from α to β, that is
a family (Q(˜ x))˜ x∈ ˜ X of probability measures over ˜ Y such that for all 1 ≤ k ≤ n
and ˜ y ∈ ˜ Y , vk(˜ y)=EukQ(˜ x)(˜ y). When α is suﬃcient for β and β is suﬁcient
for α, α and β are called equivalent.
In our case, the statistician is player i, and two experiments are given by
the families αi =( uy−i){y−i,ν(y−i)>0} and βi =( vy−i){y−i,ν(y−i)>0} of probabil-
ities over Xi and Y i deﬁned by uy−i(xi)=P(xi/y−i) and vy−i(yi)=P(yi/
y−i). Since Emy−iφi(xi)(yi)=

xi P(xi/y−i)P(yi/xi)=P(yi/y−i), φi deﬁnes
a stochastic transformation from αi to βi. Therefore αi is suﬃcient for βi.
Theorem 3.1 For all i, the following statements are equivalent:
(i) ∀ xi ∈ Xi, Eφi(xi)q(yi)=r(xi)
(ii) ∀ xi ∈ Xi, φi(xi)(yi) > 0 ⇒ q(yi)=r(xi)
(iii) ∀ xi
0,x i
1 ∈ Xi, φi(xi
0)(yi)φi(xi
1)(yi) > 0 ⇒ r(xi
1)=r(xi
0)
(iv) αi and βi are equivalent
(v) The distributions of r(xi) and q(yi) on ∆(Y −i) are equal. Namely ∀ q0 ∈
∆(Y −i),µ ({r(xi)=q0})=ν({q(yi)=q0}).
In particular, φ is faithful if and only if any of these conditions is true for all
player i.
Proof of the theorem:
We start the proof with a lemma :
Lemma 3.1 Writing ψi(yi)(xi)=P(xi/yi), we have q(yi)=Eψi(yi)r(xi) for
all yi ∈ Y i.
Proof of the lemma: q(yi)(y−i)=

xi P(xi/yi)P(y−i/xi)=Eψi(yi)ri(xi).
(ii) ⇒ (i) is straightforward.
(iii) ⇒ (ii) See that for yi ∈ Y i, ψ(yi)(xi) > 0 if and only if φi(xi)(yi) > 0.
If for all these xi, r(xi) takes the same value, then q(yi) also takes this value.
(i) ⇒ (iii) Consider a connected component C of the graph G on Xi ∪ Y i
where xi and yi are connected whenever φ(xi)(yi) > 0. Now let q0 be an
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extremal point of co ({r(xi),x i ∈ C ∩Xi}∪{q(yi),yi ∈ C ∩Y i}). Since r(xi)=
Eφ(xi)q(yi), any xi ∈ C ∩ Xi such that r(xi)=q0 is only connected to points
yi such that r(yi)=q0. Conversely, as q(yi)=Eψi(yi)r(xi), for yi ∈ C ∩ Y i, yi
connected to xi and q(yi)=q0 imply that r(xi)=q0 . Therefore, if xi
0,x i
1 ∈ Xi




(iv) is equivalent to (v) In the case where the marginal of P on {y−i ∈
Y −i,P(y−i) > 0} is uniform, the distributions of r(xi) and of q(yi) are the
standard measures associated with αi and βi. Theorem 4 of [Bl51] shows that
the standard measures associated to αi and βi are equal if and only if αi and βi
are equivalent. Blackwell’s result easily extends to the case where the marginal
of P on {y−i ∈ Y −i,P(y−i) > 0} is not uniform.
(v) ⇒ (ii) Assume that for all q0 ∈ ∆(Y −i), µ({r(xi)=q0})=ν({q(yi)=





r(xi)=q0 µ(xi)φi({q(yi)=q0}). This can hold only if
r(xi)=q0 implies φi({q(yi)=q0}) = 1. Therefore (ii) holds if r(xi)=q0.W e
get an equivalent system of equations if r(xi)  = q0, and the proof is completed
by induction on the cardinality of Xi.
(ii) ⇒ (v) For q0 ∈ ∆(Y −i), ν({q(yi)=q0})=Eµφi(xi)({q(yi)=q0})=
µ({r(xi)=q0}).
We also need to deﬁne an ε-faithful interpretation. First we deﬁne a metric
on ∆(Z) for Z ﬁnite by d(ρ1,ρ 2) = maxz∈Z |ρ1(z) − ρ2(z)|.
Deﬁnition 3.4 For ε>0, a consistent interpretation φ is a ε-faithful in-
terpretation when for all i, xi ∈ Xi and yi ∈ Y i, φi(xi)(yi) > 0 implies
d(r(xi),q(yi)) ≤ ε.
Proposition 3.1 J is faithfully reproducible from I if and only if there exists
an ε-faithful interpretation for all ε>0.
Proof: The direct proof is obvious since a faithful interpretation is also a ε-
faithful interpretation. For all ε>0, the set of ε-faithful interpretations from
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I to J is compact in the set of interpretations from I to J endowed with the
metric D(φ1,φ 2) = maxi,xi d(φi
1(xi),φ i
2(xi)). If these sets are non-empty, their
intersection is also non-empty.
4 Equivalence theorem
Theorem 4.1 (Main Theorem) I is richer than J if and only if J is faith-
fully reproducible from I.
The remaining of this section is devoted to a proof of the theorem and to a
corollary.
4.1 Construction of strategies in Γ(J,G) from strategies in
Γ(I,G) and from φ
Assume that φ is an interpretation from I to J. Let G be a compact game,
and f a I-tuple of strategies in Γ(J,G). The I-tuple of strategies e in Γ(I,G)
is deﬁned by ei(xi)(Bi)=

yi φi(xi)(yi)fi(yi)(Bi) for Bi Borel subset of Si.
Lemma 4.1 If φ is a compatible interpretation, e and f induce the same dis-
tribution on S.





Lemma 4.2 If φ is faithful and f is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(J,G), e is a
Nash equilibrium of Γ(I,G)
Proof: We use the remark 2.1. For xi ∈ Xi and σi ∈ Σi,
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= Ep(xi)gi(ei(xi),e −i(x−i))
This completes the ﬁrst part of the proof of the main theorem.
4.2 Construction of a faithful interpretation if I is richer than
J
First, we assume that the inclusion D(I,G) ⊃ D(J,G) is also satisﬁed when
G is an upper semi-continuous game, and prove the existence of a faithful
interpretation under this assumption. Then we complete the proof of the main
theorem using approximations of upper semi-continuous games by continuous
games.
4.2.1 Case where the payoﬀ function may be upper semi-continuous
An upper semi-continuous (or u.s.c.) game is given by ((Si)i,g), where
the sets Si’s are compact, and g : S → (I R∪{−∞})I is an upper semi-continuous
payoﬀ function. For G an u.s.c. game and an information structure I,Γ ( I,G)
and D(I,G) are deﬁned as in the case of a compact game.
Given an information structure J, we construct an u.s.c. game G = G(J)
as follows: An element of Si = Y i×∆(Y −i) is a couple (si
Y ,s i
∆), and the payoﬀ




Y ) > 0, and gi(sY ,s ∆)=
−∞ otherwise. The payoﬀ of i does not depend on s−i
∆ nor on si




Now consider an information structure I, and a I-tuple e of strategies in
Γ(I,G). For xi ∈ Xi, ei(xi) is a probability measure over Y i × ∆(Y −i). We
denote by ei
Y (xi) and ei
∆(xi) its marginals on Y i and ∆(Y −i) respectively.
In G, each player announces a signal and a probability over the signals of the
others. The payoﬀ function is designed such that each player has incentive to
announce as probability his conditional probability over the signals announced
by the others. More precisely, e induces with µ a probability Pe on X × Y ×
Πi∆(Y −i), and Pe(s−i
Y /xi)=Epi(xi)e−i
Y (x−i)(s−i
Y ) is the conditional probability
on xi that the other players announce the signal s−i
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Lemma 4.3 e is a Nash equilibrium of Γ(I,G) if and only if for all i and
xi ∈ Xi, ei
∆(xi) is the Dirac mass at Epi(xi)e−i
Y .
Proof: From remark 2.1, e is a Nash equilibrium if and only if for all i and
xi ∈ Xi, ei
∆(xi) ∈ argmaxσi
∆∈∆(∆(Y −i)) Epi(xi)˜ gi(σi
∆,e −i
Y (x−i)). Note that for
γ,δ ∈ ∆(Y −i),







Where D(γ δ) is the relative entropy (or Kullback Leibler distance [CT91])
between γ and δ. By property of the relative entropy, D(γ δ) ≥ 0, with
D(γ δ) = 0 if and only if δ = γ. This proves the lemma.
Proposition 4.1 Assume that D(I,G) ⊃ D(J,G) for the previously deﬁned
u.s.c. game G, then J is faithfully reproducible from I.
Proof: Let the (pure) strategies in Γ(J,G) be deﬁned by fi(yi)=( yi,qi(yi))
(qi(yi)(y−i)=
ν(y−i,yi)
ν(yi) ).By lemma 4.3, f is a Nash equilibrium. Let e be a Nash
equilibrium inducing the same distribution on the actions of G. An interpreta-
tion φ is given by φi(xi)(yi)=ei
Y (yi). The proposition is a consequence of the
two next lemmas.
Lemma 4.4 φ is a compatible interpretation from I to J.
Proof: Just note that the marginals on Y of the distributions induced by e and
f on S are ν and the image of µ by φ respectively.
Lemma 4.5 φ is faithful.
Proof: Take xi ∈ Xi and yi ∈ Y i such that φi(xi)(yi) > 0. As e is a Nash equi-
librium, ei
∆(xi) is the Dirac mass at Epi(xi)e−i
Y (x−i)=Epi(xi)φ−i(x−i). Then
ei(xi)(yi,Epi(xi)φ−i(x−i)) > 0. As e and f induce the same distribution on the
actions of G, there exists y
 i ∈ Y i such that fi(xi)(y
 i,Epi(xi)φ−i(x−i)) > 0. By
deﬁnition of f we have y
 i = yi, and qi(yi)=Epi(xi)φ−i(x−i).
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4.2.2 Case where the payoﬀ function is continuous
Here we approximate the game G = G(J) by a family of continuous games
GK = GK(J), for K<0. We study the best response correspondence of
Γ(I,G K), then we construct an interpretation from I to J from a Nash equi-
librium of Γ(J,G) and prove that it is an ε-faithful interpretation.
For some K, GK = GK(J) is the compact game whose spaces of strategies
are Si, and with payoﬀ function given by gi
K(sY ,s ∆) = max{g(sY ,s ∆),K}.W e
again write gi




Lemma 4.6 Let γ ∈ ∆(Y −i), and δ ∈ argmaxδ ∈∆(Y −i) Eγ˜ gi
K(δ ,y−i). There




if y−i ∈ J, δ(y−i)=0if
y−i  ∈ J, and y−i ∈ J if γ(y−i) > − 1
K
Proof: Take δ ∈ argmaxδ ∈∆(Y −i) Eγ˜ gi










Then if δ(y−i) <p m, δ(y−i) = 0. Maximizing

δ (y−i)≥pm γ(y−i)lnδ (y−i)





Put J = {y−i,δ(y−i) > 0}, we have to prove that y−i ∈ J if γ(y−i) > − 1
K. Take




















j∈J γ(j) and b = γ(j0). We get
Eγ˜ gi
K(δ ,y−i) − Eγ˜ gi
K(δ,y−i) ≥ blnb − Kb+ alna − (a + b)ln(a + b)
Since a + b ≤ 1,
Eγ˜ gi
K(δ ,y−i) − Eγ˜ gi
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Therefore Eγ˜ gi
K(δ ,y−i) > Eγ˜ gi
K(δ,y−i)i fγ(j0) > − 1
K, which proves that if
γ(j0) > − 1
K, j0 ∈ J.
Lemma 4.7 For ε>0, there exists K<0 such that for , γ ∈ ∆(Y −i),
δ ∈ argmaxδ ∈∆(Y −i) Eγ˜ gi
K(δ ,γ) implies d(δ,γ) <ε .
Proof:T a k e 0 <ε<1
2.A s Y −i is ﬁnite, we can take K<−1
ε such that
for all γ ∈ ∆(Y −i),

j∈J γ(j) > 1 − ε
2 with J = {y−i,γ(y−i) > − 1
K}. Take
δ ∈ argmaxδ  Eγ˜ gi
K(δ ,y−i). If δ(y−i) > 0, γ(y−j) ≤−1
K ≤ ε, and if δ(y−i)  =0 :








− 1 ≤ ε
Now we can construct ε-faithful interpretations.
Proposition 4.2 If I is richer than J, there exists an ε-faithful interpretation
from I to J for all ε>0.
Proof:F o rε>0, let K be chosen such that δ ∈ argmaxδ  Eγ˜ gi
K(δ,y−i) implies
d(δ,γ) < ε
2.T oyi ∈ Y i we associate f∆(yi) that maximizes Eqi(yi)˜ gi
K( .,y −i).
The I-tuple of (pure) strategies f in Γ(J,G K) deﬁned by fi(yi)=( yi,f ∆(yi))
is a Nash equilibrium. Take a Nash equilibrium e of Γ(I,G K) inducing the
same distribution on S as f, and let ei
Y (xi) and ei
∆(xi) be the marginals of
ei(xi)o nY i and ∆(Y −i). An interpretation from I to J is again deﬁned by
φi(xi)=ei(xi). We see, as in the case where G is u.s.c., that φ is a compatible
interpretation. We have to prove that φ is ε-faithful.
Consider xi ∈ Xi and yi such that φi(xi)(yi) > 0. Let U ⊂ Y i × ∆(Y −i)
be the support of the image of µ by fi. The support T of ei(xi) is included
in U. By deﬁnition of f, the section of U by {yi}×∆(Y −i)i s{yi,fi
∆(yi)}.
The section of T by {yi}×∆(Y −i) is not empty since ei
Y (xi)(yi) > 0, there-
fore it is also {yi,fi
∆(yi)}. Then fi
∆(yi) ∈ argmaxδ Epi(xi)˜ gi
K(δ,e−i(x−i)(y−i))
= argmaxδ Eri(xi)˜ gi
K(δ,y−i), with ri(xi)=Epi(xi)e−i
Y (x−i)=Epi(xi)φ−i(x−i).
From the choice of K, d(fi
∆(yi),ri(xi)) < ε
2, but also d(fi
∆(yi),qi(yi)) < ε
2
since f is a Nash equilibrium. This ﬁnally proves that d(ri(xi),qi(yi)) <ε .
Proof of Theorem 4.1: As seen in proposition 3.1, the existence for all ε>0
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of an ε-faithful interpretation from I to J implies the existence of a faithful
interpretation.
Corollary 4.1 A consistent interpretation φ from I to J is a faithful inter-
pretation if and only if for every compact game G and every Nash equilibrium
f of Γ(J,G), the strategies deﬁned by e(xi)=

yi φ(xi)(yi)f(yi) form a Nash
equilibrium of Γ(I,G).
Proof: The only if sense is a consequence of the lemmas 4.1 and 4.2. For
the if proof, take ε>0, then choose K and construct an equilibrium f0 of
Γ(I,G K) as in the proof of proposition 4.2. Also let xi ∈ Xi and yi ∈ Y i
be such that φi(xi)(yi) > 0. We still have d(f∆(yi),q(yi)) < ε
2.O n




K(δ,y−i), which implies that d(f∆(yi),Epi(xi)φ−i(x−i)) < ε
2.
This proves that φ is ε-faithful for all ε, and therefore φ is faithful.
5 Equivalence classes – Examples
5.1 examples
Example 5.1
With two players we represent information structures by matrices. Each
cell contains its probability to be drawn, player 1 is informed about the row,






x2 1/6 0 1/6
y2 0 1/6 1/6
z2 1/6 1/6 0
I2
Let φ be the interpretation from I2 to I1 deﬁned by φ1(x2)=φ1(y2)=x1,
φ1(z2)=y1 for player 1, and φ2(a2)=φ1(b2)=a1, φ1(c2)=b1 for player 2. φ
is a faithful interpretation from I2 to I1.
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5.2 Equivalence relation
Deﬁnition 5.1 I and J are equivalent information structures whenever I
is richer than J and J is richer than I.
Example 5.2
a3 b3 c3
x3 1/6 1/12 1/12
y3 1/6 1/12 1/12
z3 1/3 0 0
I3
We see that in I3 the second and third columns are the same, as are the ﬁrst
and second rows. If we set φ1(x3)=φ1(y3)=x1, φ1(z3)=y3, and φ2(a3)=a1,
φ2(b3)=φ2(c3)=b1, we see that I3 is richer than I1. Conversely, a faithful





2c3. Therefore I3 and I1 are equivalent.
5.3 Deterministic interpretations
Deﬁnition 5.2 A interpretation φ from I to J is said to be deterministic
when for every xi ∈ Xi, the support of φi(xi) is a singleton, that is when φi is
a mapping from Xi to Y i.
Example 5.3
This is the case of the interpretation from I2 and I3 to I1, but not of the one
from I1 to I3.
Deﬁnition 5.3 An information structure ˜ J is called minimal when any faith-
ful interpretation from an information structure I to ˜ J is deterministic.
Proposition 5.1 For any information structure I, there exists an information
structure ˜ J that is equivalent to J and minimal.
Proof:O nY i we deﬁne an equivalence relation by yiRy
 i when q(yi)=q(y
 i).
Let ˜ Y i be the set of equivalence classes for R on Y i, and let ψ be deﬁned by
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ψi(yi)(˜ yi)=1i fyi ∈ ˜ yi, and ψi(yi)(˜ yi)=0i fyi  ∈ ˜ yi.˜ ν represents the image
by ψ of ν, so that ψ is a compatible interpretation from J to ˜ J =( (˜ Y i)i, ˜ ν).
Lemma 5.1 ψ is a faithful interpretation from J to ˜ J.
For yi,y
 i ∈ Y i and ˜ yi ∈ ˜ Y i such that ψi(yi)(˜ yi)ψi(y
 i)(˜ yi) > 0, yi ∈ ˜ yi and
y
 i ∈ ˜ yi. Then q(yi)=q(y
 i), therefore Eq(yi)ψ−i(y−i)=Eq(y
 i)ψ−i(y−i).
On the other hand, an interpretation ˜ ψ from ˜ J to J is given by ˜ ψi(˜ yi)(yi)=
ν(yi)
˜ ν(˜ yi) if yi ∈ ˜ yi, and ˜ ψi(˜ yi)(yi)=0i fyi  ∈ ˜ yi.
Lemma 5.2 ˜ ψ is a faithful interpretation from ˜ J to J.
See that for ˜ y ∈ ˜ Y , the restriction of ν to the cartesian product of
the sets ˜ yi is a product measure. If y ∈ ˜ y, ν(y)=˜ ν(y)Πi
ν(yi)
˜ ν(˜ yi), and thus
ν(y)=˜ ν(˜ y) ˜ ψ(˜ y)(y). Then ˜ ψ is a consistent interpretation from ˜ J to J.I f
˜ ψi(˜ yi)(yi) ˜ ψ(˜ yi)(y
 i) > 0, yi,y
 i ∈ ˜ Y i, and q(yi)=q(y
 i).
To get ˜ J from J, we identify the signals of player i in J that lead to
the same conditional probability on the signals of the other players. The next
lemma shows that if we do this a second time, we still get ˜ J. Let ˜ q(˜ yi)b et h e
conditional probability of ˜ ν over ˜ Y −i given ˜ yi.
Lemma 5.3 For ˜ yi, ˜ y
 i ∈ ˜ Y i, ˜ q(˜ yi)=˜ q(˜ y
 i) implies ˜ yi =˜ y
 i.
Proof: Take yi ∈ ˜ yi and y
 i ∈ ˜ y
 i, since ˜ ψ is faithful q(yi)=E˜ q(˜ yi) ˜ ψ(y−i)=
E˜ q(˜ y
 i) ˜ ψ(y−i)=q(y
 i). Therefore ˜ yi =˜ y
 i.
Proof of the proposition: Consider a faithful interpretation φ from I to ˜ J. Take
xi ∈ Y i, and ˜ yi, ˜ y
 i ∈ ˜ Xi such that φi(xi)(˜ yi)φi(xi)(˜ yi) > 0. ˜ q(˜ yi)=˜ p(˜ y
 i),
therefore yi = y
 i.
6 Concluding remarks.
We have introduced a dual approach to the classical approach of correlated equi-
libria. We considered normal form games extended by information structures,
but rather than making the information structure vary to get all the correlated
equilibrium distributions of the normal form game, we compared two informa-
tion structures by making the normal form game vary. We then obtained a
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characterization of “I is richer that J” where the normal form game does not
appear.
The relation “I is richer that J” deﬁnes a partial order relation on the
information structures. The smallest element is the trivial information structure
where each player has only one signal that appears with probability one.
In this framework, the normal form games are supposed compact and the
information structures ﬁnite. One may wonder if the main theorem holds with
a smaller class of games (ﬁnite games for instance) and with a bigger class of
information structures.
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